Title: Replication Data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors

Type Dataset Duflo, Esther, Greenstone, Michael, Pande, Rohini, Ryan, Nicholas (2018): Replication Data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors. Harvard Dataverse. Dataset. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/T6HEYF

Authors: Duflo, Esther (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ; Greenstone, Michael (University of Chicago) ; Pande, Rohini (Harvard Kennedy School) ; Ryan, Nicholas (Yale University) ; Duflo, Esther (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ; Greenstone, Michael (University of Chicago) ; Pande, Rohini (Harvard Kennedy School) ; Ryan, Nicholas (Yale University) ;

Links

• Item record in Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab Dataverse
• Digital object URL

Summary

We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator.

More information

• DOI: 10.7910/DVN/T6HEYF

Subjects

• Social Sciences

Dates

• Publication date: 2018
• Submitted: July 10, 2018
• Updated: April 02, 2020

Notes

Rights

• info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ CC0 Waiver

Format

electronic resource

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