Title: Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Type Dataset Bryan, Gharad, Karlan, Dean, Zinman, Jonathan (2017): Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment. Harvard Dataverse. Dataset. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PBQE5A

Authors: Bryan, Gharad (London School of Economics) ; Karlan, Dean (Yale University) ; Zinman, Jonathan (Dartmouth College) ; Research Transparency, Data Ethics, and Governance (Innovations for Poverty Action) ;

Links

• Item record in Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab Dataverse
• Digital object URL

Summary

Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of selection on repayment likelihood, selection on susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. Implementing our method in South Africa we find no evidence of screening but large enforcement effects.

More information

• DOI: 10.7910/DVN/PBQE5A

Subjects

• Social Sciences, Household Saving, Personal Finance, Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design, Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages, Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, Economic Development: Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance

Dates

• Publication date: 2017
• Submitted: December 01, 2017
• Updated: November 13, 2019
• Collected: 2008-02 to 2009-07

Notes

Rights

• info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 CC0 1.0

Funding Information

Format

electronic resource