Title: The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Type Dataset Allcott, Hunt, Sweeney, Richard (2018): The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment. Harvard Dataverse. Dataset. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LPICQ6

Authors: Allcott, Hunt (New York University) ; Sweeney, Richard (Boston College) ; Allcott, Hunt (New York University) ; Sweeney, Richard (Boston College) ;

Links

• Item record in Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab Dataverse
• Digital object URL

Summary

With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy-efficient durable goods. Although a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information to more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy-efficiency investments at current prices in this context.

More information

• DOI: 10.7910/DVN/LPICQ6

Subjects

• Social Sciences, energy efficiency, energy-using durables, information disclosure, randomized field experiments

Dates

• Publication date: 2018
• Submitted: January 17, 2018
• Updated: July 25, 2018

Rights

• info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ CC0 Waiver

Format

electronic resource

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